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A. THERE IS NO LEGITIMATE DISPUTE THAT THE CHURCH \VAS THE 
ONLY ENTITY AT THE CLEAN UP, THAT THE SMOCK THE CHURCH 
FORCED MR. HENRIE TO \:YEAR \:Y AS GROTESQUELY LARGE, THAT 
MR. HENRIE WAS ORDERED TO FULFILL THE CHURCH'S 
ASSIGNMENT TO CLEAN UP, AS \YELL AS \VEAR THE SMOCK IN 
ORDER TO PARTICIPATE IN THE CLEAN UP. 
The Church tries to downplay its role in the clean up, characterizing it as the Church 
"facilitated a 'service project."' 1 However, nowhere in the record, which was the Church's burden 
on summary judgment, does the Church state that there were any other entities there conducting the 
clean up. The Church never has disputed this. 
Additionally, while the Church claims that Mr. Henrie was not ordered or required to 
participate in the clean up, Mr. Henrie's testimony was that his bishop's request to him to go to the 
clean up was an external order. R., p. 148 (Henrie Depa., p. 61, l. 7 top. 63, l. 15). This is 
supported by Mr. Henrie's bishop's affidavit, stating that the stake president made a "request" of 
Church members to go to the clean up as an "assignment." R., pp. 212-213 (Affidavit o_f Fred Zundel, 
,r,r 5-6). The Church also does not dispute that the order it gave to Mr. Henrie complies with Church 
doctrine, as councils in the Church are expected to elicit from their members efforts to meet 
organizational needs. R., p. 203. 
Additionally, the Church misrepresents the record by stating that the smock worn by Mr. 
1 See Respondent's Brief, p. 1. 
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al 
to to one was the 
handed to and worn by Mr. Henrie. R., p. 266-269. The only evidence in the record is Mr. Henrie's 
testimony that it was "very grotesquely large." R., p. 154 (Henrie Depa., p. 88, ll. 13-20). Clearly, 
it was an issue of fact as to \vhether it was reasonably foreseeable for the Church to know that 
forcing Mr. Henrie to wear a "grotesquely large" smock, and the smock getting caught on the 2 foot 
70 pound logs Mr. Henrie was throwing down a hill would lead to his injuries. 
Also, there was a special relationship between the Church and Mr. Henrie. First, there is no 
dispute that Mr. Henrie was the Elders Quorum President of his ward. Second, Mr. Henrie was also 
"ordered" by his bishop to perform the assignment of the clean up. Third, the Church controlled 
Mr. Henrie's actions, by ordering him to go to the clean up and wear the smock. The Church's agent 
who handed out the smocks told Mr. Henrie that if he did not wear the grotesquely large smock, 
which was all the Church had left, then he could not participate in the clean up. This fact is 
corroborated by the video the Church/Mormon Helping Hands took. As this Court can see from the 
video, at 48-52 seconds into the video, as well as at 1 :06-1 :13 minutes into the video, there are 
sisters handing out smocks and telling people where to go. R., p. 129 (Gabiola A.ff, Exh. B). The 
Video shows the tables and the women handing out the smocks,just exactly as Mr. Henrie testified 
to in his deposition. In sum, Mr. Henrie being ordered by the Church to clean up, as well as to wear 
2See Respondent's Brief, p. 4. 
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a 
it an as to cause, as to over 
again ordering him to go to the clean up and also to wear the grotesquely large smock \Vhile he did 
the clean up. The District Court's grant of summary judgment under these facts is clearly reversible 
error. 
B. AS THE DISTRICT COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN DETERl\lINING 
THE CHURCH O\VED NO DUTY, SUMMARY JUDGMENT \VAS NOT 
PROPER. 
As previously asserted by Mr. Henrie, clearly it was reasonably foreseeable that the Church 
owed a duty to Mr. Henrie not to cause him harm, especially when it ordered him to go to the clean 
up, and ordered him to wear the grotesquely large smock to participate in the clean up. These facts 
establish that a special relationship existed between the Church and Mr. Henrie. 
The Church denies it owed any duty or that there was a special relationship. In support of 
its position, the Church relies upon two cases, Boots v. Winters, 145 Idaho 389, 179 P.3d 532 (Ct. 
App. 2008) and Beers v. Corp. of President of Church, 155 Idaho 680, 316 P.3d 92 (2013). 
However, both of those cases are inapposite to this case. 
With respect to Boots, the issue the Court of Appeals addressed there was whether a landlord 
owed a duty to victims, who were not tenants of the landlord, who were injured by a tenant's dog. 
Boots, 145 Idaho at 391, 179 P.3d at 354. Further, in Boots some of the victims were two young 
boys that were attacked by a dog after one of the boys provoked the dog. Id, 145 Idaho at 394, 179 
P.3d at 357. In that factual context, the Court of Appeals stated "we are aware of no Idaho authority 
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to no to m case. In 
addition to the fact that this is not a dog bite case, Boots is inapposite, as the issue there was 
whether a landlord was required to protect third persons from a tenant's dog. Clearly there was no 
special relationship between the landlord and the victims, who were passerbys, and \Vho had 
provoked the tenant's dog. 
Contrary to Boots, here Mr. Henrie is a member of the Church, and the Elders Quorum 
President of his \vard, who was ordered to perform an assignment handed down from his stake 
president to his bishop to him. The Church also ordered Mr. Henrie to wear the smock or he could 
not participate in the clean up. As the Church controlled Mr. Henrie's conduct, a special 
realtionship arose. 
Additionally, the Church's reliance upon the holding in Beers, is also misplaced. As the 
Church acknowledges, the factual circumstances in Beers are different from the case at issue. 3 
Beers involved a minor, whose parents sued the Church for injuries she sustained after she jumped 
from a bridge while attending a camp out that was being held among members of the same ward4. 
This Court in Beers reasoned that the Beers' claim against the Church was properly dismissed on 
summary judgment, after noting the following facts5: I) There was no evidence the Church had any 
3 See Respondent's Brief, p. 19. 
4Beers, 155 Idaho at 683, 316 P.3d at 95. 
5See Beers, 155 Idaho 687-88, 316 P.3d at 99-100. 
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to at 
case Mr. as was at Bishop-see p.148 
(Henrie Depo. pp. 61:7-63: I 5); 2) No ward member had undertaken supervision of the bridge 
jumping activity (not the case with Mr. Henrie, as the clean up was conducted by the 
Church/Mormon Helping Hands, and it ordered him to wear the smock to participate-see, R., 
pp. 152 (Henrie Depo., pp. 77:3-79: 19); R., pp. 153-54 (Henrie Depo., pp. 83: 1-84:8; 86:2-7; 
87:10-16)); 3) the bridge jumping \Vas not an official ward activity and occurred away from the 
camp out location (not the case here, as the clean up was an official Church activity); and 4) the 
bridge jumping took place after the conclusion of the last ward planned activity (Mr. Henrie's 
injury occurred during the Church's clean up activity-seeR.,p. 169-70 (Henrie Depo.,p. 146:4-
23; 149: 13-150:3)). In summary, Beers is clearly inapposite, as Mr. Henrie was following the 
Church's order, engaged in Church activity, and was injured during that activity. 6 
Furthermore, the Church takes the position that the District Court correctly identified all of 
the appropriate factors to recognize foreseeability of harm, and applied those factors to the facts 
6The Church also cites to Beers for the proposition that this Court was "unable to ascribe 
more blame to the [Church} for this incident." Beers, I 55 Idaho at 687-88, 316 P.3d at 99-100. 
The Church also notes this Com1 noted the negative consequences to the community imposing 
liability upon religious organizations to members of their faith, noting this would result in a 
disincentive to organize fellowship activities. Id. First, again, as previously stated, the facts in 
Beers do not match those in the case at hand, as clearly here we have a Church sponsored event, 
controlled solely by the Church, who then controlled Mr. Henrie's conduct in forcing him to 
perform clean up work at its direction. As a result, the holding in Beers should be limited to the 
facts of that case. 
REI'L Y BRIEF - PAGE 5 
of harm to 
plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the connection between the 
defendant's conduct and the injury suffered, the moral blame attached to the 
defendant's conduct, the policy of preventing future harm, the extent of the 
burden to the defendant and consequences to the community of imposing a 
duty to exercise care with resulting liability for breach, and the availability, 
cost, and prevalence of insurance for the risk involved. 
Coghlan v. Beta Theta Pi Fraternity, 133 Idaho 388,399,987 P.2d 300,311 (l 999)[internal citations 
omitted]. It must be remembered, that this Court, in Sharp v. W.H. A1oore Inc., 118 Idaho 297,300, 
796 P.2d 506, 509 (1990), explained the concept of duty and foreseeability, as follows: 
Every person has a general duty to use due or ordinary care not to injure 
others, to avoid injury to others by any agency set in operation by him, and 
to do his work, render services or use his property as to avoid such injury. 
The degree of care to be exercised must be commensurate with the 
danger or hazard connected with the activity. \Vhether the duty attaches 
is largely a question for the trier of fact as to the foreseeability of the 
risk. Foreseeability is a flexible concept which varies with the 
circumstances of each case. \Vhere the degree of result or harm is great, 
but preventing it is not difficult, a relatively low degree of foreseeability 
is required. Conversely, where the threatened injury is minor but the 
burden of preventing such injury is high, a higher degree of 
foreseeability may be required. Thus, foreseeability is not to be 
measured by just what is more probable than not, but also includes 
whatever result is likely enough in the setting of modern life that a 
reasonably prudent person would take such into account in guiding 
reasonable conduct. 
Sharp, 118 Idaho at 300-01, 796 P.2d at 509-10 [internal quotations and citations omitted] [bold 
emphasis supplied]. 
The record here shows that the District Court did not consider all the factors. Instead, it 
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considered and analyzed the factor of \Vhether the degree of result or harm was great, but preventing 
it was not difficult. Had the Court truly addressed that factor, it would have been in Mr. Henrie's 
favor. The degree of result of harm here was great, forcing Mr. Henrie to wear the smock while 
throwing 2 foot 70 pound logs in an industrial type setting. Further, that harm was easily 
preventable, i.e. the Church not forcing Mr. Henrie to wear the grotesquely large smock. 
In addition, nowhere did the District Court indicate in its decision that it considered the 
factor as to whether the threatened injury was minor but the burden of preventing the injury was 
high. Again, had the District Court considered this factor it would have gone in Mr. Henrie's favor, 
as the threatened injury was not minor. While the Church tries to downplay it, Mr. Henrie suffered 
7The Church inaccurately quotes Mr. Henrie's statements in his initial brief related to the 
District Court placing sole emphasis on whether imposing a duty would kill the Mormon 
Helping Hands. The Church's misquote, with its errors in bold, is as follows: 
Henrie argues that "It beggars belief that the Church's liability to Mr. Henrie for 
damages [no comma] would "kill" any future efforts by the Church, since it is 
well known that the church is an (sic) multibillion dollar religious/charitable 
organization." 
Respondent's Brief at p. 15. The actual passage from Mr. Henrie's brief, at page 33, with the 
differences from the Church's quote in bold, was as follows: 
It beggars belief that the Church's liability to Mr. Henrie for damages, would 
"kill" any future efforts by the Church, since it is well-known that the Church is a 
multi-billion dollar religious/charitable organization. 
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\Vas not as not wear 
Furthermore, the record does not show that the District Court considered the closeness of the 
connection between the Church's conduct and the injuries suffered, the policy of preventing future 
harm, the extent of the burden to the Church or the availability, cost and prevalence for the risk 
involved. 
The only concern for the District Court was the effect on the Church. In is response, the 
Church did not dispute Mr. Henrie's argument, that the District Court improperly sided with the 
Church by declining to impose a duty on the Church as a charitable entity. The District Court's 
decision violates this Court's holding in Steed v. Grand Teton Counsel of the Boy Scouts of America, 
Inc., 144 Idaho 848, 172 P.3d 1123 (2007). There, this Court rejected arguments that it should 
immunize charitable organizations from liability in tort for public policy reasons. Steed, 144 Idaho 
at 856, 172 P.3d at 1131. In sum, the language in Steed, as well as this Court limiting the holding 
in Beers to the facts presented in that case establish the District Court improperly granted summary 
judgment to the Church. 
C. THE RECORD ESTABLISHES THAT MR. HENRIE HAD A SPECIAL 
RELATIONSHIP \VITH THE CHURCH THEREBY CREATING A DUTY 
THE CHURCH O\VED TO MR. HENRIE. 
The Church misread Mr. Henrie's Opening Brief, when it asserted that "nowhere in his brief 
does Henrie analyze or even discuss the relevant rules and factors for determining the existence of 






and Rees v. State Dept. of Health and Welfare, 143 Idaho 10, 137 P.3d 397 (2006). A special 
relationship can arise where a party against whom the duty has been asserted, has exercised some 
right to control the injured party's conduct. Twpen, 133 Idaho at 248, 985 P.2d at 673. Again, as 
Mr. Henrie argued in his Opening Brief, and has argued here, the Church certainly had the right to 
control Mr. Henrie's conduct, such that a special relationship existed between it and him. It is not 
disputed that Mr. Henrie was a member of the Church, and the Elders Quorum President of his ward. 
While it is factually disputed by the Church, Mr. Henrie's testimony was that he was given an 
external order by the Church through his Stake President and his Bishop to go to the clean up. The 
Church also ordered Mr. Henrie to wear the smock or he could not paiiicipate. The record is replete 
with facts establishing that the Church had the right, and did impose control over Mr. Henrie's 
conduct. 
For the Church to assert that Mr. Henrie was not in the custody of the Church at the time of 
the accident, and that they were not controlling his conduct in throwing logs down the hill, misses 
the point. Mr. Henrie was certainly in the Church's custody, as the Church was the only entity that 
organized the clean up, was the only entity that was handing out the smocks and had ordered Mr. 
Henrie to go to that clean up by handing down the assignment from stake president, to bishop, to 
8See Respondent's Brief, p. 18. 
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Church and Mr. Henrie, thereby establishing a duty that the Church O\ved to Mr. Henrie. The 
Church breached its duty, which is an issue of fact for a jury, not the District Court, to decide. 
D. THE DISTRICT COURT INCORRECTLY RULED ON THE ISSUE OF 
PROXIMATE CAUSE. 
The Church cites to Lambertv. Hasson, 121 Idaho 133,823 P.2d 167 (Ct. App. 1991) where 
the Court of Appeals held "proximate cause is generally an issue for the jury unless the proof is so 
clear that reasonable minds cannot draw different conclusions or where all reasonable minds would 
construe the facts and circumstances one ,vay." 9 Lambert supports Mr. Henrie's position, as the 
facts in this case establish that an issue of fact exists as to proximate cause. 
The Church claims that the record does not reflect the Church exercised any control over 
Henrie as to it being obligatory for him to be involved in the clean up and being forced to wear the 
smock. Once again, the record belies the Church's position. As to being ordered to go to the clean 
up, as has been previously stated and reiterated by Mr. Henrie, the stake president gave the 
assignment, which were Mr. Henrie's bishop's words, and that Mr. Henrie took that as an 
assignment, again, according to Mr. Henrie's bishop. R., pp. 212-13. Mr. Henrie certainly took it 
as an external order, given solely to him, and, being raised in the LOS faith, noted, that when a 
bishop tells him to do something, he does it, because he feels as ifhe is doing the work of the Lord. 
9Lambert, 121 Idaho at 137,823 P.2d at 171. 
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never no to p. 
150 (Henrie Depa., p. 69:5-12). This corresponds with the Church's policy for its members to 
respond to its needs. R., p. 203. Further, Mr. Henrie was also ordered to wear the smock or the 
Church would not allow him to participate. R., p. 154 (Henrie Depa., p. 86:2-22). The record 
ce1iainly raises an issue of fact regarding whether Mr. Henrie was ordered to clean up and \Vear the 
smock by the Church. Mr. Henrie felt, as a lifelong LOS member, and the Elders Quorum President 
of his ward, that he had an external order from the Church to go to the clean up and had no choice 
in the matter. That is an issue of fact for the jury to decide, not the District Court on summary 
judgment. 
E. THE DISTRICT COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN EXCLUDING MR. 
HENRIE'S TESTIMONY THAT THE CHURCH'S AGENT TOLD HIM HE 
\VAS REQUIRED TO \VEAR THE SMOCK OR HE COULD NOT 
PARTICIPATE IN THE CLEAN UP. 
The Church did not refute Mr. Henrie's citation to State v. Watkins, 148 Idaho 418,421,224 
P.3d 485,488 (2009). 10 To reiterate this Court's rule from that case, a trial court's discretion does 
not entitle it to alter or disregard specific standards or ignore that it is bound by rules of law. 
10The Church mistakenly claims that Mr. Henrie conflated the summary judgment 
standard with that for the admission of evidence. As the Court can see, at pages 21 through 23 of 
his initial brief, Mr. Henrie recited the standard related to the Court's exclusion of the admission 
of a party opponent, and, in those passages, Mr. Henrie not only identified the standard, but that 
the District Court failed to properly follow that standard. 
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rulings, courts not " ' 1 Idaho at 1,224 d 
at 487-88. Further, the Church also did not dispute that a trial court's discretion is only broad where 
it is the fact finder and bounded by the rules and principles of law. Id., 148 Idaho at 421, 224 P.3d 
at 488. This Court in Watkins held that the district court in that case abused its discretion, when 
it incorrectly rule on an issue related to hearsay. Id., 148 Idaho at 423-427, 224 P.3d at 490-494. 
Likewise, in this case, the District Court erred in applying the hearsay rule pursuant to IRE 
801 (d)(2)(D). I I 
The colloquy between Mr. Henrie and the Church's agent at the tables, that Mr. Henrie had 
to wear the smock or could not participate is not hearsay. The Church put their agents at those 
tables, with the authority to prevent Mr. Henrie from working unless he wore the smock. The 
Church's agent's statement, pursuant to Idaho Rule of Evidence 80l(d)(2)(D) is an admission by 
the Church and therefore not hearsay, as it is corroborated by the Mormon Helping Hands video. 12 
II 
Mr. Henrie also notes that the Church did not oppose or refute Mr. Henrie's argument 
that by granting summary judgment to the Church, the District Court denied him his 
constitutional right to a jury trial. See Appellant's Opening Brief, p.23. 
12The Church cites to R Homes Corp. v. Herr, 142 Idaho 87, 123 P.3d 720 (Ct. App. 
2005), where the Court of Appeals held there needs to be independent evidence of an agency to 
corroborate the declarations of an alleged agent. R Homes Corp., 142 Idaho at 93, 123 P.3d at 
725. The Court should look at R Homes for that Jaw, but find that it is factually inapposite to the 
case at hand. Again, what the Church does not and cannot refute is the fact that it was the only 
entity that had set up the clean up effort in every respect. 
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cases V. 10, 1 
278 (1972) and Bailey v. Ness, 109 Idaho 495, 708 P.2d 900, 902 (1995). The Church has not 
disputed that it has long been settled that apparent authority exists "when a principal voluntarily 
places an agent in such a position that a person of ordinary prudence, conversant with the business 
usages and the nature of the particular business, is justified in be! ieving that the agent is acting 
pursuant to existing authority." Clark v. Gneiting, 95 Idaho 10, 12, 501 P.2d 278, 280 (1972); 
Bailey v. Ness, 109 Idaho 495, 497, 708 P.2d 900, 902 (1985) (citing, Clark, supra). Apparent 
authority is sufficient to bind a principal to a contract entered into by an agent with a third party, as 
long as the agent acted within the course and scope of authority delegated by the principal. Clark, 
supra. 95 Idaho, at 11-12, 501 P.2d at 279-80; Bailey, supra, 109 Idaho at 498, 708 P.2d at 903. In 
addition, the issue of apparent authority is a question for the jury to decide. Clark, 95 Idaho at 12, 
13 Respondent's Brief, pp. 30-36. The Church also cited to US. v. Portsmouth Paving 
Co,p., 694 F.2d 312 (4th Cir. Ct App. 1983), which is supportive of Mr. Henrie's position. In 
Portsmouth Paving, the Fourth Circuit held that an agency relationship existed between the 
alleged agent, thereby attributing the agent's declaration against the adverse party. In 
Portsmouth, Portsmouth Paving Corporation's president was indicted for conspiracy to allocate 
contracts and to rig bids in violation of the Sherman Act. Id., 694 F.2d at 315. One of the US 
Government's witnesses testified as to Portsmouth Paving Corporation's president's 
involvement in the antitrust conduct, and at one point he had called the president's office and 
spoken with a secretary, which Portsmouth objected to as inadmissible hearsay. Id., at 321. 
However, the Fourth Circuit concluded that it was not hearsay, finding that there was sufficient 
independent evidence to establish the existence of the agency relationship and hold the agent's 
statement attributed to the president of Portsmouth Paving as an admission of a party opponent. 
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independent the as 
evidence are admissible." Clark, supra, 95 Idaho at 12, 501 P.2d at 280 (citations 
omitted)( emphasis supplied)). 
Here, the record shows the Church's agents were handing out the smocks. The Church was 
the only entity that had organized the clean up effort. The Church placed its agents at the tables 
handing out smocks. The Mormon Helping Hands video establishes and corroborates this. Thus, 
it was clear error for the District Court to conclude that there was no corroborative evidence 
whatsoever. The District Court's decision excluding that evidence is the type of erroneous action 
this Court found improper in State v. Watkins, supra., 148 Idaho at 423-27, 224 P .3d at 490-94. 
Thus, this Court must reverse and remand. 
F. MR. HENRIE IS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS ON 
APPEAL. 
Mr. Henrie is entitled to attorney's fees and costs under Idaho Code § 12-121 and Idaho 
Appellate Rules 40 and 41. Mr. Henrie submits that as the District Court erred in granting to 
summary judgment, his appeal is not frivoulous, but reasonable and with proper foundation. For 
these reasons, Mr. Henrie is entitled to an award of attorney's fees and costs on appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Mr. Henrie respectfully requests that the Court reverse the District 
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